In the Indian legal system, the law of limitation serves the indispensable purpose of providing finality to litigation, by prescribing the period within which a legal proceeding must be initiated. The Limitation Act, 1963 (the Act) consolidates and modernises earlier legislation. Part III of the Act (Sections 12 to 24) deals specifically with the computation of periods of limitation.

That is, after one has identified the “prescribed period” for filing a suit, appeal or application (for instance from Schedule of the Act or from another enactment), Part III lays down how that period is to be calculated: what day is to be reckoned, what days are to be excluded, when the clock begins to run, and so on. A proper understanding of Sections 12 to 24 is critical, especially in litigation practice, because an error in computation may render a claim time-barred even though the substantive right might be sound.

Section 12 – Exclusion of Time in Legal Proceedings
Section 12 of the Act provides for the exclusion of certain time periods when computing the period of limitation. The text of Section 12(1) states that “In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded.” Thus, if a cause of action accrues, the first day is not counted. The purpose is to avoid penalising the litigant for the neat, practical fact of the day of accrual being used as the starting point.

Section 12(2) goes further: “In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.” The “time requisite for obtaining a copy” is to be excluded; the litigant cannot be held strictly to the limitation period without taking into account that they must wait for the certified copy of judgment or order to which the remedy pertains.

Section 12(3) and (4) expand the concept further: Section 12(3) excludes the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment in certain appeals, and Section 12(4) deals with an application to set aside an arbitration award, by excluding the time required to obtain the copy of the award. There is also an Explanation appended which clarifies that in computing “time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order,” any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for copy thereof is made shall not be excluded.

In sum, Section 12 ensures equity by recognising that certain procedural delays are intrinsic to litigation and should not be counted against the party’s limitation-clock.

For instance, in the context of appeals the Supreme Court in earlier jurisprudence under the 1908 Limitation Act held that the time for obtaining a certified copy must be excluded from the limitation period even if the appeal may not be filed immediately, because without the certified copy, the party cannot initiate the remedy. In practice, this means that a party must exclude the day of accrual, count only from next day, and if a decree or judgment is involved the clock begins only after the judgment plus certified copy period are excluded.

Sections 13 to 18 – Special Exclusion or Postponement Clauses
Although your request focuses on Sections 12–24, for completeness it is worth noting that after Section 12 the Act provides further sections (13 to 18) dealing with special scenarios: for example, Section 13 excludes time while an application for leave to sue/appeal as a pauper (indigent person) is pending, Section 14 excludes time taken in bonafide but infructuous proceedings in a court lacking jurisdiction, Section 15 deals with situations like the defendant being absent from India, or execution of a decree being stayed, and so on. While these sections are important in computational practice, the heart of the computation rules lies in Sections 12, 21, 22, 23 and 24, which directly govern the arithmetic of limitation.

Section 21 – Effect of Substituting or Adding New Plaintiff or Defendant
Section 21 provides that where after institution of a suit a new plaintiff or defendant is added, the suit as regards him shall be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. However the proviso carries an exception: it does not apply where the party is added or substituted owing to assignment or devolution of interest or where a plaintiff is made defendant or vice-versa. The practical effect is that when new parties come in (other than by assignment or devolution) the limitation clock as to them begins at the moment they are brought in. This is more of a “deemed institution of suit” rule than a pure computation rule. Nonetheless, it is part of Part III.

Section 22 – Continuing Breaches and Torts
Section 22 of the Act states: “In the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues.” This provision deals with the scenario of a “continuing wrong” or “continuing breach.” The essential difference from a simple lapse of time is that the wrongful act or breach is not a one-time event but continues over time, day by day, thus giving rise to fresh causes of action de die in diem (from day to day).

The jurisprudence recognises that Section 22 applies only in cases of a continuing wrong (a wrongful act creating a continual source of injury), and not simply successive breaches or repeated independent acts. For example, where the obligation is to pay quarterly rent and a party fails each quarter, such failure constitutes successive breaches—not a continuing breach—and Section 22 will not apply. The High Court of Kerala recently observed that limitation begins to run from the date of cessation of breach when the contract obligation itself comes to an end, emphasising that a fresh clock runs until the wrongdoing ends.

From a practical standpoint, Section 22 allows a claimant in a case of continuing breach/tort to sue within the limitation period from the last moment of the breach – i.e., one need not file the suit within the prescribed period from the first breach, because each moment of the continuing wrong resets the limitation clock. This is especially relevant in environmental torts, riparian rights, trade-mark infringements, etc.

Section 23 – Suits for Compensation for Acts Not Actionable Without Special Damage
Section 23 provides that when a cause of action arises only when some specific injury results (i.e., the act itself is not actionable until specific damage occurs), then the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the injury results. In other words, if a wrongful act is done that in itself is not immediately actionable but becomes actionable only when the damage manifests, the limitation period does not start until that damage occurs.

To illustrate: if a party drills underground under a neighbour’s land without causing immediate surface injury, but eventually the surface subsides and damage occurs at a later date, the limitation clock begins from the date of the subsidence (i.e., injury) and not from the date of drilling. The Law Commission’s Report in fact gave such illustration. This principle is rooted in fairness: the cause of action is not complete until the injury results.

Section 24 – Computation of Time Mentioned in Instruments
Section 24 is comparatively straightforward: it declares that “All instruments shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be made with reference to the Gregorian calendar.” Thus, where an instrument (such as a promissory note or deed) uses some other calendar (say a local Indian calendar) or specifies time periods in terms of native dates, for the purpose of computing limitation the Gregorian calendar must apply. The effect is to remove ambiguity in dates and to standardise the start-point calculation.

General Principles of Computation
Beyond the text of these sections, certain guiding principles emerge from the case law and commentary. First, the limitation period runs from the date of accrual of the cause of action—unless postponed or excluded by other sections. Secondly, the party must compute the period properly: exclude the starting day (Section 12(1)), add any excluded periods (Section 12), convert calendars (Section 24), or defer the running because of continuous wrong (Section 22) or injury (Section 23). Thirdly, the prescribed period in the Schedule of the Act or other enactment is exclusive of excluded time but inclusive of subsequent days unless properly excluded. Fourthly, if a suit is not filed within the limitation, it is time-barred unless an exception (e.g., extension under Section 5 or revival under other statute) applies.

Illustrative Applications
Suppose a lease contract entitles the lessee to have the premises maintained in tenantable repair and the lessee fails for three years. The failure to repair is continuous—a continuing breach—so Section 22 may apply: each day’s failure is a fresh cause of action and the limitation would run from the last day of the breach. Contrast this with failure to pay quarterly rent: each unpaid quarter is a separate breach and the limitation period (say 3 years under Article 113 of the Schedule) would run from each unpaid quarter, not from the first unpaid date.

In another scenario, assume a person makes an underground tunnel under a neighbour’s land and no visible damage appears until three years later when the surface collapses. The drilling itself may not have created an actionable cause until the subsidence; thus Section 23 would require computation from date of collapse (injury) rather than date of drilling.

If a judgment is delivered on 1 January 2023 and a party obtains the certified copy on 15 January 2023, then for the purpose of filing an appeal the limitation period begins after excluding the day of judgment (1 Jan), and excluding the time for certified copy (1 Jan to 15 Jan) pursuant to Section 12(2). Thus, the limitation period would start from 16 January 2023 (the next day after receipt of copy) unless other exclusion periods apply.

Challenges in Practice and Case-Law
One practical challenge is in distinguishing a continuing breach (Section 22) from successive breaches. The latter do not invoke Section 22. The Supreme Court in Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan (1959) held: “Section 22 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong…Where the act or wrong is complete, Section 22 has no application although the damage may continue.” Another difficulty arises in reckoning the “time requisite for obtaining a copy” under Section 12(2): courts have held that this is not limited to the time after the judgment; it may include the time reasonably needed for making application, and some delay attributable to the litigant may not be excluded.

An example of continuing wrong was observed in recent quasi-judicial orders interpreting Section 22: in one case the board held that where liability (liquidated damages) accrues monthly due to continuing breach of contract, the period of limitation resets each month. Similarly, the High Court of Kerala held that when contract period expired and thereby the breach ceased, limitation began to run from expiration date.

Special remarks for lawyers
For a lawyer (such as yourself, Aishwarya), awareness of these computation rules is crucial at the drafting stage. Before filing, one must compute the limitation period, check for any excluded time (Section 12), identify whether continuing wrong (Section 22) or injury-based delay (Section 23) applies, ensure that the correct calendar (Gregorian) is applied (Section 24), and verify whether substitution of parties (Section 21) alters the start-point. When defending a suit, a plea of limitation must consider whether the claimant has properly excluded or postponed any part of time-period under these sections. Given the procedural consequence of delay—often non-extension for suits (as opposed to applications)—computational errors may lead to dismissal.

Conclusion
The computation of the period of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963 is not simply mathematical reckoning of years and days. It is a nuanced process governed by Sections 12 to 24, which address exclusion of time, substitution of parties, continuing wrongs, injury-based accruals, and calendar considerations. The practitioner must apply these rules with care: the day of accrual is excluded (Section 12(1)), certain preparatory time is left out (Section 12(2)-(4)), a new limitation may begin each day in a continuing breach (Section 22), and the injury may mark the start in certain claims (Section 23). Without such care, a meritorious claim may fail on the ground of limitation—even before reaching its merits.