Introduction

In the Indian legal framework, the law of limitation serves primarily to prescribe time-limits within which rights must be enforced, thereby giving finality and certainty to property and other disputes. Most provisions of the Limitation Act deal with barring remedies after a certain period. However, Part IV of the Act, comprising Sections 25, 26 and 27, deals with a special category of rights — namely acquisition of ownership (or rights) by possession. These provisions go beyond mere extinguishment of remedy and, in certain cases, lead to extinguishment of the right itself and confer ownership (or easementary) rights through prescription. Their importance lies in the fact that long possession can transform into legal title, provided statutory conditions are satisfied.

Practitioners must be aware that the scope of Sections 25 to 27 encompasses acquisition of easements by prescription (Section 25), exclusion in favour of reversioner of servient tenement (Section 26), and extinguishment of right to property (Section 27) which is arguably the most potent. The interplay of these sections with the Articles in the Schedule (notably Article 65 for immovable property) and the doctrine of adverse possession has been subject to evolving jurisprudence. A lawyer dealing with property disputes must appreciate the thresholds of possession, interruption, timing, the nature of the claim (whether for easement, way, watercourse or full ownership), and the consequences of non-action by the rightful owner.

This article will first examine Section 25, then Section 26, then Section 27, followed by key judicial interpretations that have shaped the law of acquisition by possession. Finally, there will be practical observations for legal practice and concluding remarks.

Section 25 – Acquisition of Easements by Prescription

Section 25 of the Limitation Act reads in relevant part: “Where the access and use of light or air to and for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith as an easement, and as of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, and where any way or watercourse or the use of any water or any other easement (whether affirmative or negative) has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto as an easement and as of right without interruption and for twenty years, the right to such access and use of light or air, way, watercourse, use of water, or other easement shall be absolute and indefeasible.”

Sub-section (2) further provides that each of the said periods of twenty years shall be taken to be a period ending within the two years next before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates is contested. Sub-section (3) substitutes “thirty years” instead of “twenty years” where the property over which the right is claimed belongs to the Government.

What this provision does is provide for acquisition of easementary rights by prescription. An easement is a right enjoyed by one tenement (dominant) over the servient tenement (for example a right of way, right of water, right to light or air, negative easements). Section 25 stipulates that if someone has enjoyed the right “as of right” (that is, without force, without secrecy, and without permission), openly and continuously, without interruption for the statutory period (twenty years, or thirty for government land), then the right becomes “absolute and indefeasible.”

The expression “as of right” essentially overlays the familiar common-law criteria of prescription: open, notorious, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted. The Explanation to Section 25 clarifies that nothing is an interruption unless there is an actual discontinuance of possession or enjoyment for at least one year because of an obstruction by some person other than the claimant, and unless such person has notice thereof and the claimant has acquiesced for one year.

For example, if a person has used a path across a neighbour’s land openly and continuously as of right without interruption for twenty years and within two years before the suit date the twenty years’ period ends, then his right to that way becomes absolute and indefeasible under Section 25.

The mimimum critical elements are:

(i) enjoyment of the right of easement for the requisite period,

(ii) enjoyment must be without interruption,

(iii) enjoyment must be as of right (i.e., without the express permission of the servient owner, and not by force or secret occupation),

(iv) the period must end within two years before suit. If the property is government land, the period is thirty years.

The sub-section (2) ensures the period ends no earlier than two years before the suit is instituted, thereby avoiding indefensible claims based on ancient enjoyment.

Jurisprudence has held that the right sought must be that of an easement and that natural rights, for example drainage of rainwater, may not always qualify. In Rachhaya Pandey and Ors v. Sheodhari Pandey and Ors. (1963) the Calcutta High Court held that the right to drain off rainwater according to the natural position of the land does not attract Section 25.

In Manindra Nath Bose v. Balaram Chandra Patni and Ors. (1973) the High Court held that a customary right of way by all villagers may not be a right which can be acquired by prescription under Section 25, because it lacked exclusivity and clarity. Therefore, the courts insist upon correctly defined easementary rights.

It is important to note that Section 25 deals only with easements and not full ownership of land (that is covered by other Articles or Section 27). In that sense, Section 25 operates in the sphere of servitudes, not the entire title to immovable property. Moreover, the interruption clause must be strictly satisfied — mere occasional obstruction or cessation of use less than one year may not qualify as “interruption”.

The Act treats the years of enjoyment only if uninterrupted except for an obstruction which lasts at least one year and becomes known and acquiesced. The commercial value of Section 25 is that a creditor or person benefiting from easementary rights can claim an indefeasible title to that easement after the statutory period. This in turn gives certainty of title.

The corporate practitioner should also note the exclusion in Section 26 (examined next) which tempers Section 25 in favour of reversioner of the servient tenement.

Section 26 – Exclusion in Favour of Reversioner of Servient Tenement

Section 26 reads: “Where any land or water upon, over or from which any easement has been enjoyed or derived has been held under or by virtue of any interest for life or in terms of years exceeding three years from the granting thereof, the time of the enjoyment of such easement during the continuance of such interest or term shall be excluded in the computation of the period to twenty years in case the claim is, within three years next after the determination of such interests or term resisted by the person entitled on such determination to the said land or water.”

In simpler terms, Section 26 provides a protective mechanism for the reversioner (owner on expiration of the life interest or lease) of the servient tenement. If during the period of enjoyment of the easement the servient tenement was held by someone under a life-interest or lease exceeding three years, then the time of such enjoyment during that interest cannot count towards the twenty years for prescription, provided the claim is resisted within three years of expiry of that interest.

The rationale is that the servient tenement changed status during the period of life interest or long lease; the reversioner should not be prejudiced by the servient owner’s long interest. Thus, computation of the twenty years must exclude the period during which the easement was enjoyed over a tenement under life/term interest exceeding three years.

Practically this means that when a dominant tenement claims an easement by prescription under Section 25, the servient owner (or his successor) may say that part of the enjoyment period was during a lease of the servient tenement for long term or life interest and must be excluded from the calculation. The claimant must then institute the suit within three years of the lease or life interest expiry to preserve the benefit of counting time. If the claimant fails to do so, Section 25 cannot be invoked. The interplay between Sections 25 and 26 is therefore of significance in cases of longstanding leases/tenancies and easement claims.

While Section 26 is less often discussed than Section 27, its existence is important especially in rural/agrarian contexts where land is leased for long terms or life interests exist. The practitioner must check whether the servient tenement was subject to a long lease or life interest and whether the claim falls within the three-year period after expiry.

Section 27 – Extinguishment of Right to Property

Section 27 declares: “At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.” This provision represents a departure from the usual operation of limitation statutes, which normally extinguish only the remedy and not the substantive right. Section 27 extinguishes the right itself when the limitation period expires in a suit for possession of property.

According to the historical commentary of the Law Commission of India, Section 27 “applies to movable as well as immovable property including a hereditary office.” The operation is as follows: when the person entitled to institute a suit for possession fails to do so within the period prescribed (for instance under Article 65 of the Schedule for immovable property), then that person’s right to the property is extinguished and the possessor may, by operation of law, acquire ownership-rights.

The connection between Section 27 and the doctrine of adverse possession is crucial. The Schedule of the Limitation Act specifies for suits for possession of immovable property based on title an Article (Article 65) that prescribes a period of twelve years. When someone is in adverse possession (open, continuous, hostile, exclusive) of the property and the true owner does not sue within twelve years, under Section 27 the true owner’s right is extinguished and the adverse possessor acquires title. The Supreme Court in recent times has reaffirmed this.

For example, in *Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur & Ors. (2019 8 SCC 729) the Court held that once the period of twelve years’ adverse possession is over, the owner’s right to eject the possessor is lost and the possessory owner acquires the right, title and interest possessed by outgoing owner. The Court observed: “In paragraph 62: We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years’ period of adverse possession is over, even owner’s right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has prescribed.”

Thus Section 27 has the effect of converting what was a possessory right into a full right of ownership once the liability or remedy of the true owner is extinguished by limitation. The statute thus recognizes prescription as a mode of acquisition of title, not simply a procedural bar.

It is to be noted however that for Section 27 to operate, the claim must be one for possession of property and the time period must have expired. It is not enough for a claimant to have long possession unless the other conditions (such as hostile possession, knowledge, exclusivity) are met.

The jurisprudence emphasises that mere long possession will not automatically lead to acquisition of title through Section 27; the element of adverse possession (hostile possession) is vital. The Supreme Court in Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram (2020-11 SCC 263) held that “trespasser’s long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession.” Moreover the Court stated: “Adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to co-exist at the same time, namely nec vi (adequate in continuity), nec clam (adequate in publicity) and nec precario (adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge).”

In addition to the classic common-law tests, Indian law after the Limitation Act, 1963 emphasises that the plea of adverse possession is founded on the statute of limitation (Article 65) and Section 27 which extinguishes the true owner’s right. The possessor must plead and prove adverse possession; the burden lies on the defendant (posing as possessor) if sued.

For government property, different rules apply and in many cases public policy may intervene; but for private immovable property the doctrine is firmly recognized.

Key Judicial Interpretations

A number of leading judgments have clarified the scope and operation of Sections 25-27. The Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) is a watershed. That decision held that acquisition of title under adverse possession is available not only defensively (as a shield) but may be asserted affirmatively (as a sword) by a possessory owner once twelve years have passed.

Prior to this, there had been a divergence in High Court decisions regarding whether a person in adverse possession could file a suit for a declaration of title. The three-judge bench in 2019 up-held that such a suit is maintainable. The Court reiterated that Section 27 gives a substantive right and the possessor acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person.

In Uttam Chand v. Nathu Ram (2020) the Supreme Court held that mere long possession without adverse quality will not suffice. The Court emphasised that the ‘title’ acquired by adverse possession must be pleaded and proved and cannot be accidental. In Government of Kerala v. Joseph (AIR 2023 SC 3988) the Court held that the mere length of possession by itself did not constitute adverse possession as envisaged under Article 65 of the Act; the nature of possession bears scrutiny.

In relation to easements, in Rachhaya Pandey v. Sheodhari Pandey and Manindra Nath Bose v. Balaram Chandra Patni (both cited earlier) the courts held that Section 25 applies only to genuine easementary rights and not to rights of natural drainage or ill-defined customary rights. The commentary of the Law Commission emphasises that Section 26 must be properly considered in every prescription of easement claim.

Another insightful exposition is captured in the article by Saji Koduvath Associates on Section 27 which states: “Section 27 is a provision in the Limitation Act that gives a substantial right to a party. … Adverse possession confers title under Sec. 27 (by necessary implication, because extinguished right of real owner comes to vest in wrong-doer).”

For government land or public property there are additional policy considerations and the period may differ (30 years for easement claims under Section 25) or limitation may not adequately apply. Nevertheless, the doctrinal framework holds.

Practical Implications for Legal Practice

For you, as a legal practitioner (especially in property litigation), the significance of Sections 25-27 cannot be overstated. In cases where your client has enjoyed a right of way, watercourse, light or other easement for a long period, Section 25 may provide a route to indefeasible title to that easement. One must ensure that the enjoyment was as of right (i.e., without force, secrecy or permission), continuous and without interruption of one year or more, and that the statutory period ends within two years of suit. Also check whether the land belonged to the Government, in which case 30 years is required. The presence of a life-interest or long lease on the servient tenement triggers Section 26’s exclusion provision.

In full scale title or possession disputes, Section 27 and the corresponding Article (e.g., Article 65) of the Schedule will be critical. If your client has been in exclusive, open, continuous, adverse possession for twelve years, you might argue that the true owner’s right is extinguished and that your client now holds title. You must plead adverse possession with requisite facts (starting date of possession, nature of possession, animus possidendi, knowledge of true owner, exclusivity, continuity etc.).

The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence underscores that merely long possession will not suffice; hostility, notice, exclusivity etc must be established. Recognise that Section 27 confers a substantive right which may allow your client to seek a declaration of title and permanent injunction. Moreover, the holder of acquired title can use it ‘as a sword’ (i.e., file a declaratory suit) and not merely ‘as a shield’ (defend in a suit). This is significant in practice.

On the defence side, if your client is the titled owner but has been out of possession for some time, you must carefully map the timeline, determine when dispossession (if any) occurred, whether it was adverse, whether the possessor has completed the period, and whether he has taken steps for declaration or recovery. If the twelve years has lapsed and the possessor meets the test, you must consider settlement or claim preservation. For easements, you must check whether interruption occurred, whether the enjoyment was as of right and whether the servient tenement had life or lease interests (triggering Section 26).

From a conveyancing or due diligence perspective, appreciating that long possession can mature into ownership highlights the need to check not only registered title, but also actual chain of possession, occupancy records, tax payments, physical occupation, ejection actions and correspondence. If a purchaser inherits a property where someone else has been in continuous adverse possession, risk arises that the possessor may assert title under Section 27 and Article 65. Therefore conveyancers should insert suitable indemnities or conduct field verification and attestation of possession.

In litigation, drafting the pleadings, evidence-in-chief and arguments must map the test of adverse possession: possession must be actual (not permissive or on behalf of owner), exclusive (or sufficiently adverse), continuous and open, with knowledge or notice to true owner. The period must have expired and suit must be filed within limitation. For easements, the same care is needed but defence may assert interruption or said enjoyment was permissive by licence.

Another practical point: [For government or public land], courts often treat adverse possession claims with caution due to public interest. The period may differ or carry higher bar. This should be kept in mind when dealing with state land.

Finally, for long-standing occupation where no suit was filed by the true owner, you may advise settlement or partition even before suit is filed, to avoid adverse possession claims maturing.

Concluding Observations

The provisions of Sections 25 to 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 concerning acquisition of ownership by possession reflect the legal policy that rights and title should not remain dormant indefinitely while another person is in de facto possession and the rightful owner fails to act. Section 25 gives a statutory prescription route for easementary rights. Section 26 provides a safeguard for the reversioner of servient tenement in prescription claims. Section 27 serves as the cornerstone for acquisition of full title by possession: once the limitation period expires, the right of the original owner is extinguished and the possessor may acquire the title.

Recent case-law of the Supreme Court has clarified that adverse possession is not mere long occupation; hostile, exclusive and continuous possession with requisite animus is required. Moreover, a possessory owner may now assert the acquired title affirmatively (not merely defensively). For lawyers who handle property rights, conveyance, adverse possession or easement claims, understanding and applying these provisions is essential.

In the Indian context where land records, mutative entries, actual possession, and occupation often diverge, these rules provide both opportunity and risk: an opportunity for a possessor to acquire title, and risk for an owner who remains inactive. Clients must be advised well about timelines, possession history, interruption of enjoyment (in easement cases), and suit filing strategy. The fruits of long possession do not accrue automatically; an informed analysis and timely action are required. For you as a lawyer in Mumbai or elsewhere in India, mastering Sections 25-27, the test of adverse possession, and the precedents is crucial for both recovery and defence of property rights.