The Latin maxim rex non potest peccare — “the king can do no wrong” — is the historical seed of the common-law doctrine of sovereign (or crown/state) immunity. Originating in medieval English law, it reflected the constitutional reality that the monarch was the source of law and therefore could not be subjected to suit in the monarch’s own courts. Over time that absolute idea was softened and adapted in modern constitutional systems which vest sovereignty in the people and make the State amenable to judicial review and liability, subject to statutory or constitutional limits.

From maxim to modern doctrine

In modern terms, the doctrine of sovereign immunity means that a State or sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent. Different systems treat the immunity differently — from absolute immunity to a qualified or waived immunity where the State accepts liability for certain acts. India’s constitutional and statutory structure does not wholly preserve feudal absolutes. Article 300 of the Constitution — the principal constitutional provision on the point — provides that the Government of India or the Government of a State may “sue or be sued” by its name and that Parliament or the State Legislatures may make provisions governing suits against the State. This text embeds the historical position into a constitutional frame but leaves space for judicial interpretation and legislative prescription.

The Indian approach — qualified, not absolute

Indian jurisprudence has rejected the idea of blanket immunity in most private-law contexts. The Supreme Court has, over decades, evolved a nuanced approach: the State can be held liable for torts committed by its servants in the ordinary course of their employment (vicarious liability) and may be amenable to public-law remedies (writs) when constitutional rights are infringed; yet certain sovereign or core governmental functions (e.g., acts integral to administration of justice, maintenance of law and order) have been treated with deference and limited immunity. Thus Indian law is best described as rejecting feudal absolutism while recognising limited immunity in narrow circumstances.

Key Indian cases

A few Supreme Court decisions crystallise the current balance:

1. State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati (1962) — This early post-Constitution decision established the State’s vicarious liability for the tortious acts of its servants (for example, negligent driving by a government vehicle causing death). The Court held the State liable in private-law claims when government servants commit torts in the course of employment. Vidyawati is widely cited as foundational for State liability in tort.
2. Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P. (Kasturi Lal) — In this line of authorities the Court grappled with police powers and seizures. The judgment is often cited for the proposition that where the State acts in exercise of sovereign powers (e.g., search, seizure, arrest under statutory authority), different considerations apply — the character of the act (sovereign or non-sovereign) matters in determining liability. The decision helped shape the distinction between acts done in sovereign capacity and those in proprietary/contractual or private capacities of the State.
3. The Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das (2000) — Perhaps the most prominent modern example of curtailing sovereign impunity, Chandrima Das held the State (through the Railway Board) liable to pay compensation where public servants (railway employees) violated fundamental rights — a gang-rape on railway premises by railway employees. The Court treated the claim as a public-law remedy arising from violation of Article 21 (right to life and dignity) and awarded compensation; it underlined that the State cannot hide behind a cloak of immunity where constitutional guarantees are breached.
4. N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P. (1994) — This case considered seizure of goods under statutory powers and explored whether the State is liable for negligence or wrongful exercise of statutory powers. The Court recognised that functions which are inalienably governmental may attract special considerations but did not endorse absolute immunity for the State in all circumstances.

Taken together these authorities show that Indian courts read rex non potest peccare out of modern constitutional law: immunity is limited, context-sensitive and subject to the Constitution’s guarantees.

Public law v. private law — a useful distinction

Indian precedent draws a distinction between private-law remedies (torts and contracts) and public-law remedies (writs under Articles 32/226) when assessing state liability. While private-law claims against the State are permissible (subject to statutory procedure and exceptions), public-law remedies are crucial when a government act violates fundamental rights. The judiciary has repeatedly made clear that public authorities cannot, by virtue of being sovereign, act arbitrarily without being answerable under the Constitution. Thus the maxim survives, if at all, only as a historical artifact, not as a licence to injure citizens.

Legislative and practical limits

Article 300 itself recognises the role of legislation: Parliament and State Legislatures may make laws governing suits against the State. Many statutory protections, procedural bars (e.g., limitation periods, notice requirements, and statutory exclusions), and doctrines (like public authorities performing core governmental functions) operate in practice to limit state liability. But those are policy and legislative limits — not a restoration of medieval immunity. Scholars and practitioners continue to debate the precise contours of functionally based immunity (what activities are “sovereign” in nature) and the adequacy of remedies for victims.

Conclusion — contemporary takeaway

Rex non potest peccare is an important constitutional and historical touchstone when discussing state immunity, but its force in India is substantially qualified. The Constitution, Article 300, and decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence combine to give citizens a right of recourse where the State or its servants negligently or intentionally harm private rights — and critically — where the State violates fundamental rights the courts will award constitutional remedies and compensation. The maxim lives on as legal history and as a reminder that notions of sovereign privilege were once absolute — a position Indian constitutionalism has decisively moderated.